PUTNAM MUNICIPAL OPPORTUNITIES TRUST Form DEFA14A May 04, 2011

SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION

PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

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PUTNAM MUNICIPAL OPPORTUNITIES TRUST

(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than Registrant)

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 - (1) Amount Previously Paid:
 - (2) Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
 - (3) Filing Party:
 - (4) Date Filed:

Putnam Municipal Opportunities Trust (PMO)

Presentation to ISS May 3, 2011

John A. Hill

Chairman of the Board of Trustees, The Putnam Funds

Jameson A. Baxter

Vice Chairman of the Board of Trustees,

The Putnam Funds

Paul D. Scanlon, CFA

Co-Head of Fixed Income, Putnam Investments

Agenda [Mr. Hill]

1. Overview:

1. PMO□s shareholders are well-served, and Karpus cannot be trusted to effect in any event.

2. Discussion:

- 1. PMO

 ☐s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiduciaries.
- 2. PMO

 s preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to common sharehol rights and legitimate expectations of preferred shareholders.
- 4. Karpus∏s agenda for PMO discredits Karpus∏s Trustee nominees as potential

3. Conclusion:

- 1. Vote PMO

 s Management Proxy (White Card):
- 1. FOR PMO□s 10 Trustee nominees voted upon by the common and preferred s
- 2. FOR PMO∏s 2 Trustee nominees voted upon by the preferred shareholders vo

- 3. AGAINST Karpus

 Is Proposal 2 recommending that PMO

 Is management contraction Management, LLC (Putnam) be terminated.
- 4. AGAINST Karpus

 substitute of shares at par and to utilize alternative sources of leverations.
- 3. ISS should **not** provide separate recommendations for each class of stock.

1. Overview

PMO□s shareholders are well-served, and Karpus cannot be trus change for all shareholders in any event. [Mr. Hill]

Karpus cannot be trusted to effect positive change for all

Karpus primary interest is in forcing PMO to provide a liquidity event allowing share position ($\sim 16\%$, or \$75M) and modest preferred share position ($\sim 4\%$, or irrespective of the impact of such a liquidity event on other shareholders.

[Karpus]s interests are not aligned with those of other common shareholders w to benefit from its closed-end, leveraged structure over the longer term.

[Karpus]s interests are not aligned with those of other preferred shareholders s shares at a substantial discount.

2.1. Discussion

PMO[s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

The economic rights of preferred and common shareholders are clearly defined

All Trustees owe the same duties to PMO (slide 6).

As a legal matter, PMO\subseterments some their primary duty to common sharehol interests of common and preferred shareholders diverge (slides 7 and 8).

PMO has satisfied its obligations to preferred shareholders (slide 9).

Preferred shareholders have no inherent right to liquidity (slide 10).

Although under no fiduciary duty or legal obligation to do so, PMO\subseteq so, PMO\subsete

As a general matter, the Putnam Funds Trustees and Put of actively addressing the particular concerns of closed-en

PMO	and l	highly
fund governance practices (slide 13).		

2.1. Discussion

PMO[]s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

The economic rights of preferred and common shareholde

Under PMO□s organizational documents, PMO**preferred** shareholders are lega PMO□s assets and earnings.

In contrast, PMO
the rights of the preferred shareholders have been satisfied.

2.1. Discussion

PMO[s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

All Trustees owe the same duties to PMO.

Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), 2 Trustees are elected shareholders.

[] 940 Act provides exclusive voting rights to preferred shareholders to ensure to (e.g., dividends and liquidation preference) are appropriately honored.

[] 940 Act does not accord any other fiduciary priority to preferred shareholders
□balancing□ of interests between preferred and common shareholders.

The fiduciary duties of corporate directors/Trustees are defined by state law.

Under state law and PMO□s organizational documents, all of PMO□s Trustees or regardless of which shareholders elected them.

Mass. Business Corporation Act, Ch. 156D, Sec. 8.30: \square [A] director shall dischain a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the c

[their actions are] in the best interests of [PMO], subject to certain 1940 Act li
☐ Each Trustee thus is a ☐ fiduciary☐ of PMO as a whole, and no Trustee is exclusionly common or preferred shareholders.

2.1. Discussion

PMO[]s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

As a legal matter, PMO s Trustees owe their primary duty the interests of common and preferred shareholders diver

The Delaware Chancery Court, to which state courts frequently look for guidance issues, has stated, □[G]enerally it will be the duty of the board, where discretion exercised, to prefer the interests of the common stock □ as the good faith judge to be □ to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of prefer conflict. □n re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 2009 WL 2225958, *7 (Del. Ch. Investors v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997).

☐hus, PMO☐s Trustees ar**not** required or permitted to engage in a ☐balancing☐ common and preferred shareholders in matters where these interests diverge.

2.1. Discussion

PMO[s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

As a legal matter, PMO_Is Trustees owe their primary duty the interests of common and preferred shareholders diver

A common example from corporate finance is instructive:

After the initial issuance of debt, the debt holders may wish to have the debt re or to receive a higher interest payment.

No responsible corporate board would seriously consider acting to redeem such interest paid in the absence of circumstances indicating that such actions would stock holders.

[\$imilarly, PMO□s preferred shareholders may wish to be redeemed or to chang they purchased, but, in the absence of circumstances indicating that such actio common shareholders, PMO□s preferred shareholders have no legitimate basis

2.1. Discussion

PMO[s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

PMO has satisfied its obligations to preferred shareholder

Since the collapse of preferred share remarketings/auctions across the industry continued to satisfy all of its obligations under both the Bylaws and the 1940 Ac PMO has paid dividends at the default interest rate set in accordance with the PMO has continued to engage and pay a remarketing agent for the conduct of PMO has assured that the preferred shares continue to be entitled to all voting PMO has continued to meet its asset coverage tests and other maintenance recommends.

2.1. Discussion

PMO[]s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

Preferred shareholders have no inherent right to liquidity

The terms of PMO□s preferred shares do not guarantee that there will be liquid remarketing/auction process or otherwise.

The offering documents for PMO

s preferred shares specifically disclosed the p result of failed remarketings/auctions.

pay dividends to preferred shareholders at a default interest rate for periods fo remarketings/auctions.

The terms of PMO□s preferred shares do not require PMO or its Trustees to provise specific cases where mandatory redemption provisions in the Bylaws are trigge asset coverage requirements).

2.1. Discussion

PMO[]s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

PMO ☐s Trustees have a demonstrated record of taking act preferred shareholders.

Although under no fiduciary duty or legal obligation to do so, PMO
s Trustees had actions over the past 3 years that have provided additional liquidity to preferre

June 2008 ☐ August 2008: PMO redeemed \$59.1M, or 15%, of then-outstanding substituting tender option bonds (TOBs) as an alternative form of leverage.

[September 2008: Putnam recommended, and the Trustees approved, the merocomparable open-end Putnam fund, subject to a number of conditions. The merothe complete redemption of all preferred shares.

November 2008 | January 2009: PMO redeemed \$156.05M, or approximately 4 preferred shares in preparation for the merger.

While efforts to complete the merger were suspended in January 2009 due to
conditions, the foregoing actions resulted in the aggregate redemption of 54.6
in liquidation preference) of the preferred shares originally outstanding.

2.1. Discussion

PMO[s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

As a general matter, the Putnam Funds Trustees and Put of actively addressing the particular concerns of closed-end

The Trustees meet regularly with Putnam regarding closed-end funds, and they performance, the trading prices (including any discounts or premiums) of funds views of shareholders in the funds.

Putnam and the Trustees have taken significant actions when circumstances in benefit the long-term best interests of shareholders:

They have merged closed-end funds.

They have merged closed-end funds together, twice in 2005 and twice in 2008

They have merged closed-end funds into open-end funds, once in 2006 and tw

They have initiated tender offers. In 2007, tender offers were conducted to outstanding common shares of each of 8 closed-end funds (including PMO) at a 98% of NAV. In 2008, a tender offer for another fund was conducted to purchas

outstanding common shares at a price per share equal to 99% of NAV.

They have instituted a share repurchase program. In 2005, the Trustees plan and have renewed it ever since. To date, the program has made a meanin investment return.

They reduced management fees for the closed-end funds, effective January management fee decreased by 15%, from 65 basis points to 55 basis points.

They have monitored the incremental earnings associated with prefer requiring Putnam to forego a management fee on assets attributable to prefer incremental earnings become negative.

2.1. Discussion

PMO[]s Trustees have acted as responsible, independent fiducian

Independent

The Trustees have an independent Chairman, John Hill.

Jameson Baxter, the Vice Chairman of the Board and Chairman of its Contract Committee, is the Cha Fund Directors Forum, which promotes vigilant, dedicated, and well-informed independent directors a voice and advocate on important policy matters.

☐1 of 12 Trustees are Independent Trustees, not ☐interested persons☐ of PMO or of Putnam.

The Independent Trustees are assisted by an independent administrative staff and by auditors and leading the Independent Trustees and independent of Putnam.

[Highly qualified, with significant current and past experience (for complete biographies, see

The Trustees are highly accomplished business and investment professionals with extensive leaders deep backgrounds in mutual fund governance.

[\$ee how Karpus]s Trustee nominees compare with the current Trustees:

PMO S Current 12 Trustees	Karpus∏s Proposed 12 Truste
4 have experience as a founder or Chief Executive Officer of a major investment firm	0 with equivalent experience
7 serve on Boards of Directors of public operating companies	1 with equivalent positions
A former Chief Financial Officer of a Fortune 100 company	0 with equivalent experience
The Chairman of the Mutual Fund Directors Forum	0 with equivalent experience
A former Director of the Investment Company Institute	0 with equivalent experience
12 have experience supervising mutual funds	3 with equivalent experience

Strong fund governance practices

(A) combination of long-tenured and newer members, bringing diverse perspectives to fund oversight

(I) No staggered board or other takeover defenses; every PMO board member stands for election each to

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2.2. Discussion

PMO[s preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate with the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverag

The cost and terms of PMO□s preferred share leverage are highly advashareholders (slide 15).

Preferred share leverage continues to add to common shareholders resulting referred share leverage continues to add to common shareholders referred share leverage continues to add to common shareholders referred share leverage continues to add to common shareholders referred share leverage continues to add to common shareholders referred share leverage continues to add to common shareholders referred share leverage continues to add to common shareholders referred shareholders re

Putnam actively monitors the marketplace for alternative financing so additional liquidity for preferred shareholders without being contrary shareholders and regularly reports to PMO_□s Trustees on these matter

Anyone evaluating a board s actions relating to ARPS redemptions sh considerations that can influence a fund s redemption rate and should single measure (slide 19).

2.2. Discussion

PMO[]s preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate with the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous.

common shareholders.

As a result of the Federal Reserve Board s decisions to maintain interest rates current cost of maintaining PMO s preferred share leverage is highly favorable shareholders.
☐ he terms of PMO☐s preferred shares are also highly favorable to PMO☐s common be replaced with any alternative form of leverage cited by Karpus.
[Maturity Preferred shares are perpetual in nature, with no stated maturity da
Callability Preferred shares are callable at any time at the option of PMO.
Puttability □ Preferred shareholders have no ability to □put□ the shares back to
Financing rate ☐ Recent dividend rates for PMO☐s Series B and Series C preferr respectively, 0.396% (4/25 failed remarketing) and 0.411% (4/28 failed remark
As an example, if a homeowner today had a mortgage whose terms featured:
[No due date,
Pre-payment at the homeowner option at any time without penalty,
No possibility of the homeowner being forced to pre-pay the mortgage, and
An interest rate hovering between 0% and 1%,
[Would it be in the best interest of that homeowner to pay off the mortgage or r

2.2. Discussion

PMOs preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute with the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage to the le

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2.2. Discussion

PMO[s preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate with the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverage to the leverage to the leverage is a leverage to the leverag

Putnam actively monitors the marketplace for alternative result in additional liquidity for preferred shareholders wi interests of PMO□s common shareholders and regularly rethese matters.

Tax-exempt closed-end funds have fewer options for alternative leverage than

[Karpus] s suggested alternative sources of leverage, including municipal term | (MTPS) and variable rate demand preferred securities (VRDPs), are **more cost!** favorable terms at this time.

Fixed dividend rates on a recent issuance of MTPS were 2.90%, with the shares mandatory call 5 years from the issue date.

[VRDPs pay dividends at variable rates, but a third party, commonly referred to provider, purchases the VRDPs in the event of a failed remarketing/auction.

These rates are typically subject to escalation in the event of an extended period remarketings/auctions, and closed-end funds are typically required to redeem by the liquidity provider if there are 6 months of continuous, unsuccessful remarketings.

Tender options bonds (TOBs), another financing source cited by Karpus, repres rather than complete, form of alternative leverage, and PMO has already taken opportunity to the extent deemed prudent.

2.2. Discussion

PMO[]s preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commutate with the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share

Since the failure of the auction-rate preferred securities (ARPS) market through 54.61% of its originally outstanding ARPS.

Analysis of the actual redemption actions of other tax-exempt closed-end funds reveals the following:

The average tax-exempt closed-end fund has redeemed 48.72% of its outstand

The median tax-exempt closed-end fund has redeemed 35.00% of its outstand

Excluding the Nuveen funds, which as an organization made a unique and high judgment by refinancing ARPS using fixed-rate preferred shares, the average for 29.95% and the median was 25.24%.

Of the 158 tax-exempt closed-end funds that still have ARPS outstanding, PMO percentage of its preferred shares since 2008 than any other fund, with the except the state of t

Excluding the Nuveen funds, industry data show that PMO has redeemed a high single one of the 135 other tax-exempt closed-end funds with ARPS outstanding funds to have redeemed more than PMO are the 16 funds that have redeemed which redeemed in connection with a merger or liquidation).

A chart showing distribution of redemptions by percentage is included as Appe

Source of ARPS redemption data as of 3/31/11 is Cecilia L. Gondor, Thomas J. H.

2.2. Discussion

PMO[s preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute with the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is highly advantageous to commute the legal rights and legitimate expectations of preferred share leverage is a leverage to the legit and legit in the legit is a leverage in the legit in the legit in the legit is a leverage in the legit i

Anyone evaluating a board s actions relating to ARPS red many considerations that can influence a fund s redempti

caution in relying on any single measure.

Redemption decisions across the industry reflect many factors, including:
The relatively limited options available for refinancing ARPS,
The highly variable cost structures of ARPS issued through different underwrite in time,
The significant issuance costs for any new financing,
Fundamental investment decisions regarding the appropriate leverage structure
General business decisions such as the determination to merge or liquidate a f
[ISS should not apply a single bright-line standard for purposes of evaluating a leader to ARPS redemptions.
Any quantitative assessment should take into account the limitations of simple especially where a concentration of 100%-redemption data points can distort the
2.3. Discussion
PMO

In Putnam s hands, PMO s performance compares favora

(s	lide	21).
. –			, -

PMO

☐s Trustees have taken proactive steps in periods of to provide liquidity and enhance fund returns, while main structure (slide 23).

PMO has skilled portfolio management (slide 24).

Putnam

s fixed income investment organization is one of (slide 24).

Putnam is a leading money manager (slide 25).

2.3. Discussion

PMO[]s performance and trading price do not warrant a change :

Annualized total returns as of March 31, 2011:

	1 year	3 years	5 years
PMO at NAV	0.19%	3.52%	3.02%
PMO at market price	1.03%	6.68%	4.61%
Lipper General Municipal Debt Funds (leveraged closed-end) Average	-0.55%	3.68%	2.43%

	Expense ratio
PMO as of FYE April 30, 2010 (most recent fiscal year)	1.08%
Lipper General Municipal Debt Funds (leveraged closed-end) Average	1.23%
	21

2.3. Discussion

PMO[s performance and trading price do not warrant a change :

	Tightest discount (or highest premium)	Average discount/ premium	
			22

2.3. Discussion

PMOs performance and trading price do not warrant a change in management. [Mr. Hill]

PMO□s Trustees have taken proactive steps in periods of common share trading discounts to provide liquidity and enhance fund returns, while maintaining the fund□s closed-end structure.

The tender offer: In 2007, PMO conducted a tender offer to purchase 10% of the fund soutstanding common shares at a price per share equal to 98% of the NAV per share.

The repurchase program: Recognizing the benefit of share repurchases for less than NAV,

since 2005 Putnam and the Trustees have authorized a program to conduct open-market repurchases of outstanding common shares for PMO and all Putnam closed-end funds.

The benefit: From October 2005 to March 2011, share repurchases under both the share repurchase program and the 2007 tender offer contributed approximately 1.27% to PMO□s cumulative returns during a low-interest-rate environment for fixed income investing.

Contribution to PMO□s cumulative returns at NAV, 10/25/05-3/31/11	PMO∏s cumulative returns at NAV, 10/25/05-3/31/11
1.27%	18.53%
	23
	returns at NAV, 10/25/05-3/31/11

2.3. Discussion

PMO has skilled portfolio management (for complete biographies, see Appendix B).

PMO portfolio managers

Investment experience (years)

Responsibilities

Thalia Meehan, CFA	28	Team Leader, Tax Exempt Group
Paul M. Drury, CFA	22	Tax Exempt Specialist
Susan A. McCormack, CFA	25	Tax Exempt Specialist

Putnam s fixed income investment organization is one of the largest in the industry.

Over 60 investment professionals averaging 15 years of experience, and with \$55 billion in assets under management

Co-heads of fixed income	Investment experience (years)	Responsibilities
D. William Kohli	24	Portfolio Construction and Global Strategies
Michael V. Salm	20	Liquid Markets
Paul D. Scanlon, CFA	25	Corporate Credit and Tax Exempt

Research coverage of every global fixed income sector

% of Putnam fixed income funds that ranked above average in their Lipper groups as of March 31, 2011:

1 year	3 years	5 years	10 years
72% (21 of 29 funds)	85% (23 of 27 funds)	93% (25 of 27 funds)	92% (24 of 26 funds)

% of Putnam tax-exempt fixed income funds that ranked above average in their Lipper groups as of March 31, 2011:

1 year	3 years	5 years	10 years
87% (13 of 15 funds)	87% (13 of 15 funds)	100% (15 of 15 funds)	93% (14 of 15 funds)

2.3. Discussion

Putnam is a leading money manager.

For its 2010 investment performance, Putnam ranked in the top quartile of the mutual fund families.

Putnam ranked #1 for the same survey for 2009.

Putnam has over 70 years of investment experience, managing money for indissince 1937.

Over \$127 billion in assets under management.

[\begin{align*} \text{\$1\$ mutual funds across asset classes, and six investment categories [] growth, return, and global sector.

[23 variable annuity and variable life product choices, with subaccounts for The Group and Allstate Life Insurance Company.

311 401(k) plans including a range of Putnam funds.

[]41 investment professionals with a balance of skill and backgrounds.

Offices in Boston, London, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Tokyo, Sydney, and Singapor

Led by experienced investment managers who seek superior results over time fundamental research.

2.4. Discussion

Karpus

s agenda for PMO discredits Karpus

s Trustee nominees fiduciaries. [Ms. Baxter]

Karpus goal is to dismantle PMO s closed-end structure the costs imposed on other shareholders.

Investments in higher-yielding securities. Because a closed-end fund s sh is not required to maintain short-term, lower-yielding investments in anticipation

No sales and redemption costs. PMO does not experience the cash flows as redemptions of open-end fund shares, which create transaction costs that are be shareholders.

Ability to use leverage. Unlike open-end funds, closed-end funds are permitt leverage by issuing preferred shares.

Leverage is a viable investment tool to adjust duration, take advantage of relation curve, increase yield, and increase exposure to attractive securities and/or sections.

In April 2010, PMO shareholders wisely defeated Karpus i

For the 2 years ended December 31, 2010, PMO achieved a total return of 37.
the 20.9% return of the class A shares of Putnam s comparable open-end fund
Income Fund.

2.4. Discussion

Karpus

s agenda for PMO discredits Karpus

s Trustee nominees fiduciaries. [Mr. Scanlon]

Karpus stated agenda **to** receive the intrinsic value of shareholders by imposing significant transaction costs an ratio.

A liquidity event (i.e., a merger, open-ending, or liquidation) would repreferred shares and could impose costs on shareholders. PMO would not of its portfolio in order to redeem its outstanding preferred shares prior to a liquidating to incur significant transaction costs under certain market conditions a market losses associated with liquidating large positions in a short time frame.

A merger or open-ending would result in additional asset liquidation to likely need to liquidate additional assets in order to meet redemption requests to remain open-end fund shareholders.

Other costs associated with a merger or open-ending. PMO would likely solicitation, and other costs in connection with soliciting a shareholder vote for

Edgar Filing: PUTNAM MUNICIPAL OPPORTUNITIES TRUST - Form DEFA14A effecting the transaction.

Increased expense ratio. Significant shareholder redemptions would reduce result in an increased expense ratio for remaining shareholders.

Karpus stated agenda, if implemented, would deprive P leveraged, closed-end investment that they consciously so of options available in the marketplace.

3. Conclusions

Recommendations for PMO[s 2011 shareholder meeting [Mr. Hi

PMO[s shareholders are well-served; no management change is warrate to effect positive change for all shareholders in any event.

DO NOT VOTE Karpus s Dissident Proxy (Green Card).

PMO White Card Proposal	Proposed ISS Recommendation	Rationale
1a: Fixing the number of Trustees at 12	Vote <u>FOR</u> fixing the number of Trustees at 12.	Recommendation of th
1b: Electing Trustees	Vote <u>FOR</u> PMO∏s 10 Trustee nominees voted	PMO∏s Trustees are inc

s management contract with solid performance for Shareholders can hav
ferred shareholders voting shareholders. arpus s proposal to Putnam is a leading r s management contract with solid performance for Shareholders can have
s management contract with solid performance for Shareholders can hav
s management contract with solid performance for Shareholders can hav
Shareholders can hav
arpus∏s proposal to redeem Karpus∏s proposal is r
s at par and utilize alternate referendum. PMO[]s T
age. alternative sources of
additional liquidity for
harming PMO∏s comn
judgment, the Trustee
alternatives would be common shareholders

3. Conclusions

Recommendations for PMO[]s 2011 shareholder meeting [Ms. Ba

ISS should not issue separate recommendations for each

Karpus 2 nominees for election by the preferred shareholders do no

PMO□s nominees for election by the preferred shareholders consist of the independent of Trustees and the independent Chairman of the Audit and Compliance served on the Board of Trustees of the Putnam Funds for over 25 years. During demonstrated an outstanding record of independence and diligence in promoting shareholders.

[Karpus]s nominees for election by the preferred shareholders are (i) a person with the business of attacking closed-end funds and (ii) a person who has regularly persons engaged in such activities. Both nominees have a history of serving as attacks on closed-end funds. They cannot be trusted to independently and fairly all shareholders.

Mr. Goldstein has publicly criticized closed-end funds for redeeming preferred suspicious of some of the managers that are redeeming preferred shares, whet interest of the funds or the management company to salvage their reputations. Karpus has vigorously opposed such redemptions in the past (including in a lett attached as Appendix E) as being contrary to the interests of common sharehol significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significantly undercut their claims to champion the particular interests of the present the suspicious significant significant

3. Conclusions

Recommendations for PMO[s 2011 shareholder meeting [Mr. Hi

ISS should not issue separate recommendations for each

An ISS recommendation supporting Karpus 2 nominees for election would only be harmful to the fund.

The election of 2 Karpus nominees would disrupt the orderly governance of PM holding of separate meetings for PMO□s board. (Currently, PMO□s board meets combined meetings for all of the Putnam Funds.) As a result, PMO would incur a administrative costs due to the loss of efficiencies associated with the combine

If elected, the 2 Karpus nominees would have no power to force PMO\(\sigma\) s board to relating to the preferred and, consistent with their obligations to protect the integration could not advocate for any action that would benefit the preferred shareholders common shareholders in any event.

Because there is one fund and one fiduciary obligation to PMO as a where commendation to both classes of stock.

It would be illogical for ISS to endorse the election of 2 Karpus nominees who w
and promote actions that are fundamentally inconsistent with the strategic dire
Trustee nominees that ISS may simultaneously endorse for election by the com

Appendices

Appendix A: Trustees biographies

Appendix B: Investment managers biographies

Appendix C: Ropes & Gray LLP legal memorandum on Trustees

Appendix D: Table of distribution of ARPS redemptions among tag
failure of ARPS in 2008 through 3/31/11

Appendix E: Karpus

I letter to PMO in 2008 cautioning against All

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Trustees | biographies

John A. Hill (Chair)

(Born 1942), Trustee since 1985 and Chairman since 2000

Mr. Hill is founder and Vice-Chairman of First Reserve Corporation, the leading private equity buyout firm specializing in the worldwide energy industry, with offices in Greenwich, Connecticut; Houston, Texas; London, England; and Shanghai, China. The firm's investments on behalf of some of the nation's largest pension and endowment funds are currently concentrated in 31 companies with annual revenues in excess of \$15 billion, which employ over 100,000 people in 23 countries.

Mr. Hill is a Director of Devon Energy Corporation (a leading independent natural gas an oil exploration and production company) and various private companies owned by First Reserve, and serves as a Trustee of Sarah Lawrence College where he serves as chairman and also chairs the Investment Committee. He is also a member of the Advisory Board of the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at the Yale School of Management.

Prior to forming First Reserve in 1983, Mr. Hill served as President of F. Eberstadt and Company, an investment banking and investment management firm. Between 1969 and 1976, Mr. Hill held various senior positions in Washington, D.C. with the federal government, including Deputy Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget and Deputy Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration during the Ford Administration.

Mr. Hill was born and raised in Midland, Texas, Mr. Hill received his B.A. in Economics from Southern Methodist University and pursued graduate studies as a Woodrow Wilson Fellow.

Jameson A. Baxter (Vice Chair)

(Born 1943), Trustee since 1994 and Vice Chairman since 2005

Ms. Baxter serves as Chairman of the Mutual Fund Directors Forum. Until 2011, Ms. Baxter served as a director of ASHTA Chemical, Inc. Until 2007, she was a Director of Banta Corporation (a printing and supply chain management company), Ryerson, Inc. (a metals service corporation), and Advocate Health Care. Until 2004, she was a Director of BoardSource (formerly the National Center for Nonprofit Boards), and until 2002, she was a Director of Intermatic Corporation (a manufacturer of energy control products). She is Chairman Emeritus of the Board of Trustees of Mount Holyoke College, having served as Chairman for 5 years.

Ms. Baxter has held various positions in investment banking and corporate finance, including Vice President of and Consultant to First Boston Corporation and Vice President and Principal of the Regency Group. She is a graduate of Mount Holyoke College.

Ravi Akhoury

(Born 1947), Trustee since 2009

Mr. Akhoury serves as Advisor to New York Life Insurance Company. He is also a Director of Jacob Ballas Capital India (a non-banking finance company focused on private equity advisory services) and is a member of its Compensation Committee. He also serves as a Trustee of the Rubin Museum, serving on the Investment Committee, and of the American India Foundation. Mr. Akhoury is also a Director of RAGE Frameworks, Inc. (a private software company).

Previously, Mr. Akhoury was a Director and on the Compensation Committee of MaxIndia/New York Life Insurance Company in India. He was also Vice President and Investment Policy Committee member of Fischer, Francis, Trees and Watts (a fixed-income portfolio management firm). He has also served on the Board of Bharti Telecom (an Indian telecommunications company), serving as a member of its Audit and Compensation Committees, and as a Director and member of the Audit Committee on the Board of Thompson Press (a publishing company). From 1992 to 2007, he was Chairman and CEO of MacKay Shields, a multi-product investment management firm with over \$40 billion in assets under management.

Mr. Akhoury graduated from the	Indian Institute of To	echnology with a B.S	5. in Engineering and	d obtained an M.S. in
Quantitative Methods from SUNY	at Stonybrook.			

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Appendix A

Trustees biographies

Barbara M. Baumann

(Born 1955) Trustee since 2010

Ms. Baumann is President and Owner of Cross Creek Energy Corporation, a strategic consultant to domestic energy fi rms and direct investor in energy assets. Ms. Baumann currently serves as a Director of SM Energy Company (a publicly held U.S. exploration and production company) and Unisource Energy Corporation (a publicly held electric utility in Arizona), as well as Cody Resources Management, LLP (a privately held energy, ranching, and commercial real estate company). Ms. Baumann is a Trustee of Mount Holyoke College and serves on the Investment Committee for the college sendowmentShe is the former Chair of the Board and a current Board member of Girls Inc. of Metro Denver, and serves on the Finance Committee of The Children S Hospitabf Denver.

Prior to forming Cross Creek Energy Corporation in 2003, Ms. Baumann was Executive Vice President of Associated Energy Managers, a domestic private equity fi rm. From 1981 until 2000, she held a variety of financial and operational management positions with the global energy company Amoco Corporation and its successor, BP, most recently serving as Commercial Operations Manager of its Western Business Unit.

Ms. Baumann holds an M.B.A. from The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and a B.A. from Mount Holyoke College.

Charles B. Curtis

(Born 1940), Trustee since 2001

Mr. Curtis is President Emeritus of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (a private foundation dealing with national security issues), serves as Senior Advisor to the United Nations Foundation, and as Senior Advisor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. Curtis is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Petroleum Council. He also serves as Director of Edison International and Southern California Edison. Until 2006, Mr. Curtis served as a member of the Trustee Advisory Council of the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University.

Mr. Curtis is an attorney with over 15 years in private practice and 19 years in various positions in public service, including service at the Department of Treasury, the U.S. House of Representatives, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy.

Robert J. Darretta

(Born 1946), Trustee since 2007

Mr. Darretta serves as Director of UnitedHealth Group, a diversified health-care company, and as the Health Care Industry Advisor to Permira, a global private equity firm.

Until April 2007, Mr. Darretta was Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Johnson & Johnson, one of the world's largest and most broadly based health-care companies. Prior to 2007, he had responsibility for Johnson & Johnson's finance, investor relations, information technology, and procurement functions. He served as Johnson & Johnson Chief Financial Officer for a decade, prior to which he spent two years as Treasurer of the corporation and over 10 years leading various Johnson & Johnson operating companies.

Mr. Darretta received a B.S. in Economics from Villanova University.

Appendix A

Trustees | biographies

Paul L. Joskow

(Born 1947), Trustee since 1997

Dr. Joskow is an economist and President of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (a philanthropic institution focused primarily on research and education on issues related to science, technology, and economic performance). He is the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics and Management, Emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he joined the faculty in 1972. Dr. Joskow was the Director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT from 1999 through 2007.

Dr. Joskow serves as a Trustee of Yale University, as a Director of TransCanada Corporation (an energy company focused on natural gas transmission and power services) and of Exelon Corporation (an energy company focused on power services), and as a member of the Board of Overseers of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. Prior to August 2007, he served as a Director of National Grid (a UK-based holding company with interests in electric and gas transmission and distribution and telecommunications infrastructure). Prior to July 2006, he served as President of the Yale University Council. Prior to February 2005, he served on the board of the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research (a non-profit research institution). Prior to February 2002, he was a Director of State Farm Indemnity Company (an automobile insurance company), and prior to March 2000, he was a Director of New England Electric System (a public utility holding company).

Dr. Joskow has published seven books and numerous articles on industrial organization, government regulation of industry, and competition policy. He is active in industry restructuring, environmental, energy, competition, and privatization policies \square having served as anadvisor to governments and corporations worldwide. Dr. Joskow holds a Ph.D. and MPhil from Yale University and a B.A. from Cornell University.

Kenneth R. Leibler

(Born 1949), Trustee since 2006

Mr. Leibler is a founder and former Chairman of the Boston Options Exchange, an electronic marketplace for the trading of derivative securities.

Mr. Leibler currently serves as Vice Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital in Boston. He is also a Director of Northeast Utilities, which operates New England argest energy delivery system, and, until November 2010, was a Director of Ruder Finn Group, a global communications and advertising firm.

Prior to December 2006, he served as a Director of the Optimum Funds group. Prior to October 2006, he served as a Director of ISO New England, the organization responsible for the operation of the electric generation system in the New England states. Prior to 2000, Mr. Leibler was a Director of the Investment Company Institute in Washington, D.C.

Prior to January 2005, Mr. Leibler served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Boston Stock Exchange. Prior to January 2000, he served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Liberty Financial Companies, a publicly traded diversified asset management organization. Prior to June 1990, Mr. Leibler served as President and Chief Operating Officer of the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and at the time was the youngest person in AMEX history to hold the title of President. Prior to serving as AMEX President, he held the position of Chief Financial Officer, and headed its management and marketing operations.

Mr. Leibler graduated with a degree in Economics from Syracuse University.

Robert E. Patterson

(Born 1945), Trustee since 1984

Mr. Patterson is Senior Partner of Cabot Properties, LP and Co-Chairman of Cabot Properties, Inc. (a private equity firm investing in commercial real estate).

Mr. Patterson is past Chairman and served as a Trustee of the Joslin Diabetes Center. He previously was a Trustee of Sea Education Association. Prior to December 2001, Mr. Patterson was President and Trustee of Cabot Industrial Trust (a publicly traded real estate investment trust). Prior to February 1998, he was Executive Vice President and Director of Acquisitions of Cabot Partners Limited Partnership (a registered investment adviser involved in institutional real estate investments). Prior to 1990, he served as Executive Vice President of Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Realty Advisors, Inc. (the predecessor company of Cabot Partners).

Mr. Patterson practiced law and held various positions in state government, and was the founding Executive Director of the Massachusetts Industrial Finance Agency. Mr. Patterson is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School.

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Appendix A

Trustees biographies

George Putnam, III

(Born 1951), Trustee since 1984

Mr. Putnam is Chairman of New Generation Research, Inc. (a publisher of financial advisory and other research services), and President of New Generation Advisors, LLC (a registered investment adviser to private funds). Mr. Putnam founded the New Generation companies in 1986.

Mr. Putnam is a Director of The Boston Family Office, LLC (a registered investment adviser) . He is a Trustee of Epiphany School and a Trustee of the Marine Biological

Laboratory in Woods Hole, Massachusetts. Prior to June 2007, Mr. Putnam was President of the Putnam Funds. Until 2010, he was a Trustee of St. Mark School, until 2006, he was a Trustee of Shore Country Day School, and until 2002, was a Trustee of the Sea Education Association.

Mr. Putnam previously worked as an attorney with the law firm of Dechert LLP (formerly known as Dechert Price & Rhoads) in Philadelphia. He is a graduate of Harvard College, Harvard Business School, and Harvard Law School.

Robert L. Reynolds

(Born 1952), Trustee since 2008 and President of the Funds since July 2009

Mr. Reynolds is President and Chief Executive Officer of Putnam Investments, a member of Putnam Investments' Executive Board of Directors, and President of the Putnam Funds. He has more than 30 years of investment and financial services experience.

Prior to joining Putnam Investments in 2008, Mr. Reynolds was Vice Chairman and Chief Operating Officer of Fidelity Investments from 2000 to 2007. During this time, he served on the Board of Directors for FMR Corporation, Fidelity Investments Insurance Ltd., Fidelity Investments Canada Ltd., and Fidelity Management Trust Company. He was also a Trustee of the Fidelity Family of Funds. From 1984 to 2000, Mr. Reynolds served in a number of increasingly responsible leadership roles at Fidelity.

Mr. Reynolds serves on several not-for-profit boards, including those of the West Virginia University Foundation, Concord Museum, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Lahey Clinic, and Initiative for a Competitive Inner City in Boston. He is a member of the Chief Executives Club of Boston, the National Innovation Initiative, and the Council on Competitiveness, and he is a former President of the Commercial Club of Boston.

Mr. Reynolds received a B.S. in Business Administration/Finance from West Virginia University.

W. Thomas Stephens

(Born 1942), Trustee since 2009

Mr. Stephens retired as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Boise Cascade, L.L.C. (a paper, forest products, and timberland assets company) in December 2008.

Mr. Stephens is a Director of TransCanada Pipelines, Ltd. (an energy infrastructure company). Until 2004, Mr. Stephens was a Director of Xcel Energy Incorporated (a public utility company), Qwest Communications, and Norske Canada, Inc. (a paper manufacturer). Until 2003, Mr. Stephens was a Director of Mail-Well, Inc. (a diversified printing company). He served as Chairman of Mail-Well until 2001 and as CEO of MacMillan Bloedel, Ltd. (a forest products company) until 1999.

Prior to 1996, Mr. Stephens was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Johns Manville Corporation. Mr. Stephens holds B.S. and M.S. degrees from the University of Arkansas.

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Appendix B

Investment managers ☐ biographies

Paul D. Scanlon, CFA

Mr. Scanlon is Co-Head of Fixed Income and Team Leader of Corporate Credit and Tax Exempt at Putnam. He is a Portfolio Manager of Putnam Absolute Return 100 Fund, Putnam Absolute Return 300 Fund, Putnam Diversified Income Trust, Putnam Floating Rate Income Fund, Putnam High Yield Advantage Fund, Putnam High Yield Trust, Putnam Master Intermediate Income Trust, and Putnam Premier Income Trust. Mr. Scanlon, a CFA charterholder, joined Putnam in 1999, and has been in the investment industry since 1986.

Education: University of Chicago, M.B.A.; Colgate University, B.A.

Thalia Meehan, CFA

Ms. Meehan is a Team Leader of the Tax Exempt Group. In addition to managing Putnam sax Exempt Group, she is a Portfolio Manager of Putnam tax-exempt fixed income funds. Ms. Meehan has served on the National Federation of Municipal Analysts Board of Governors and is a member of Putnam so Diversity Advisory Councilthe Boston Municipal Analyst Forum, and the Boston Security Analysts Society, as well as the Society of Municipal Analysts. In 2002, she received the Meritorious Service Award from the NFMA. Ms. Meehan, who joined Putnam sax Exempt Bond Group in 1989, is a CFA charterholder and has been in the investment industry since 1983.

Education: Williams College, B.A.

Paul M. Drury, CFA

Mr. Drury is a Tax Exempt Specialist on the Tax Exempt Fixed Income team. He is responsible for managing several sectors within the municipal market. He is a Portfolio Manager of Putnam sax-exempt fixed income funds. Mr. Drury joined Putnam in 1989 as a Mutual Fund Accountant in the Tax Exempt Accounting Department. A CFA charterholder, he has over 21 years of investment industry experience.

Education: Suffolk University, B.A.

Susan A. McCormack, CFA

Ms. McCormack is a Tax Exempt Specialist on the Tax Exempt Fixed Income Group. She is a Portfolio Manager of Putnam sax-exempt fixed income funds. Ms. McCormack joined Putnam in 1994 as an analyst and moved into the role of Portfolio Manager in 1999. She is a CFA charterholder and has been in the investment industry since 1986.

Education: Stanford University, M.B.A.; Dartmouth College, A.B.

Appendix C

Ropes & Gray LLP legal memorandum on Trustees fiduci	ary du
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Appendix C	
Ropes & Gray LLP legal memorandum on Trustees fiduci	ary du
3	8
Appendix D	

Range of ARPS Redemptions (% Redeemed) Among Tax-Exempt Closed-End Funds	Including Nuveen Funds	Excluding Nuveen Funds
0%	20	19

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0.01% [] 9.99%	24	18
10% 🛘 19.99%	29	24
20% 🛘 29.99%	28	25
30% [] 39.99%	35	33
40% 🛮 49.99%	17	16
50% [] 59.99%	2	1
60% [] 69.99%	3	0
70% [] 79.99%	0	0
80% [] 89.99%	0	0
90% [] 99.99%	0	0
100%	82	16
Number of Tax-Exempt Closed-End Funds	240	152

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Appendix E

Karpus s letter to PMO in 2008 cautioning against ARPS redemp

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Appendix E		
Karpus Is letter to PMO in 2008 cautioning against ARPS	redem	
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Putnam Municipal Opportunities Trust (PMO)		
Presentation to ISS May 3, 2011		